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本帖最后由 dynthia 于 2016-6-28 09:58 编辑
这里对public duty rule的内在理由以及对于警察的渎职行为还有什么法律手段解释得比较清楚：
Foremost is the practical realization that individuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge "considered legislative-executive decisions" as to how particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members of the public...
Moreover, police officials who act and react in the milieu of criminal activity where every decision to deploy law enforcement personnel is fraught with uncertainty must have broad discretion to proceed without fear of civil liability in the "unflinching discharge" of their duties...
Other practical considerations come to bear at the level of day-to-day law enforcement. If the police were held to a duty enforceable by each individual member of the public, then every complaint — whether real, imagined, or frivolous — would raise the spectre of civil liability for failure to respond. Rather than exercise reasoned discretion and evaluate each particular allegation on its own merits the police may well be pressured to make hasty arrests solely to eliminate the threat of personal prosecution by the putative victim...
Furthermore, other effective mechanisms exist to control the behavior of errant police officials. Internal Metropolitan Police Department disciplinary proceedings, for example, provide a forum whereby individual officials may be held accountable for dereliction of duty, D.C.Code § 4-117 (1981), and officers who fail to arrest law breakers face formal criminal prosecution with the potential for two years' imprisonment. D.C.Code § 4-142 (1981).
Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1311-1312 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983) |
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雷达卡
发表于 2016-6-28 12:28:24
显身卡
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