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本帖最后由 烟波钓徒 于 2013-7-28 05:42 编辑
stpearl 发表于 2013-7-28 04:47 ![]()
几个关于美国社保的数据
1. 美国的OASDI，HI类似于我们所说的社保，医保。 2013年的最新税率是15.3%， 企业 ...
中文的文章我目前没看到什么靠谱的研究。也许有，但是没有公开。
宋铮和他的合作者有篇文章，他们认为再平衡的关键还是要靠工资的增长。他们考虑了三种可能性：
We consider three additional reforms. The Örst reform is a
delayed reform
, by which the current
rules of the Chinese system remain in place until a future date
T
. Then, beneÖts are permanently
reduced so as to balance the pension system in the long run. The length of the delay is chosen so as to
maximize the low-discount plannerís utility. The optimal delay is until 2050, so the reform only a§ects
the pensions of workers entering the labor force after 2012. This delay yields large welfare gains for
the transition generations relative to the benchmark reform in 2013. Quantitatively, the average gains
accruing to the cohorts retiring before 2050 would be equivalent to a 15.3% increase in their lifetime
consumption. The generations retiring in 2050 or later would only su§er small losses in the form of a
slightly lower replacement ratio.
The second reform is a
fully funded (FF) reform
that replaces the deÖned beneÖt transfer-based
pension with a fully funded individual account system. To honor existing obligations, the government
issues bonds to compensate current workers and retirees for their past contributions. A standard trade-
o§ emerges: all generations retiring after 2059 beneÖt from the fully funded reform, whereas earlier
generations lose. The attractiveness to the planner of this reform is that it reduces tax distortions on
labor supply. The shortcoming is that it eliminates a redistributive policy that the planner values.
We Önd that both the low-discount planner and,
a fortiori
, the Nordhaus planner prefer the delayed
reform to the FF reform.
The third reform is switching to an unfunded pay-as-you-go (
PAYGO
) system where the replace-
ment rate is endogenously determined by the dependency ratio, subject to a sequence of balanced
budget conditions for the pension system. The welfare e§ects of the PAYGO reform are similar, if
stronger, to those of a delayed reform. Given the demographic transition of China, the PAYGO yields
very generous pensions to early cohorts and punishes severely all generations retiring after 2046. This
2
The reform does not renege on the outstanding obligations to current retirees ñfollowing the pattern of most reforms
in OECD countries.
2
reform makes the poorer current generations share the beneÖts of high wage growth with the richer
generations that will enter the labor market when China is a mature economy, though it entails larger
labor supply distortion than the FF reform.
The results above accrue in an otherwise standard model. We show that in the absence of conver-
gence, e.g., if future wage growth was a constant 2% per year, the model would deliver mainstream
predictions: the planner would prefer an FF reform (or, alternatively, the immediate draconian reform)
to a delayed reform or to a pure PAYGO system.
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ ... rch/sswz_130606.pdf
不管怎么算，80后这一代是最没指望的一代。
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雷达卡
发表于 2013-7-26 10:20:24
显身卡
