继续搬家-美国视角1: 中国在朝鲜战争中的角色

西行的风 · 发表于 2011-12-21 01:05:51

本帖最后由西行的风于 2011-12-21 01:12 编辑

原文在西西河，我的另外一个ID 爱吃肉的兔子家园里。

近日忙中得闲,看了些美国现役和退役军人发表的一些评估和回忆朝鲜战争的文章,现在翻译总结一下,看看美方视角中的朝鲜战争.

（注：我写这个系列的目的不是夸大美军的能力，而是想展示我们的战士在怎样的艰苦条件下战斗，是怎么把自己的智慧发挥的淋漓尽致。我也不相信所谓的美国军人所说的人海战术，life is cheap in China 是他们的无知和诬蔑，我唯一相信的是：为了达到战术和战略目的，作为我方军队指挥官，只能尽可能利用自己的优势：无畏，近战，夜战和集中火力，后者尤其重要，既然我方的火力和钢铁投射在当时根本没有可能和美军比）

今天首先介绍一篇1997年的硕士论文,"朝鲜战争:中国的介入" by Harry M. Crocker. 介绍正文之前,先介绍作者,他写论文的时候是美军上士,就职于路易斯安娜州第二装甲步兵团情报分析部门,也曾经在美军第四步兵师和第十山地师服役过.

论文长达九十页,我节选了他的结论部分和一些观点(原文后是我的翻译):

"The Chinese could claim victory in that they had fought the United States to a standstill

and demonstrated to the world that they were a force not to be taken lightly. The CCF had

gained a vast amount of experience in the conduct of modern warfare as well. Approximately 73 percent of Chinas infantry forces, 67 percent of the artillery forces and 100 percent of the

armored forces participated in the conflict at one time or another."

中国可以宣称他们的胜利,因为他们(军队)的战斗阻止了美国的前进,并且向世界展示了他们不是可以轻侮的力量.同时中国志愿军也获得了丰富的现代军事作战的经验.新中国约73%的步兵,67%的炮兵还有100%的装甲兵参与了至少一次战斗.

Though China could claim victory of a sort, Maos errors ensured that he would never

realize his dream of a unified China. Marshal Nie Rongzhen best summed up the reasons for

Chinas failure to achieve its goals in intervening in the Korean War. "We entered the war in haste and were not well prepared. Moreover, we had little combat experience with the American army outside China," he stated.

尽管中国可以宣称他们的某些胜利,毛的失误却让他统一中国的梦想破灭了（注：即使没有朝鲜战争，在其爆发前三个月，美军第七舰队已经进驻台湾海峡，而后宣布台湾海峡的中立化。美国的干涉才是主席无法统一台湾的原因，作者是有偏见的。当然，朝鲜战争的爆发确实改变了中国军队在当时的战略方向。）.聂荣臻元帅最好的总结了中国武装干涉朝鲜战争却没有达到目的(注:作者认为中国失败了,因为中国尤其是毛主席的开始目标是把美国赶出朝鲜,南北统一在朝鲜人民民主共和国旗帜下)的原因: 我们没有准备好就匆忙的加入战争.而且,我们几乎没有和美国军队在国外交战的经验.

总的来说,作者对中国军队评价很客观,引用了大量我方资料.尤其是对彭德怀元帅评价很高,多次提到彭和毛的分歧,其间也提到金日成和彭德怀元帅的矛盾,原文是

Kim raged at Peng for his refusal to continue his assault against a defeated enemy,claiming the Chinese were exaggerating their problems.Despite Kims outburst, Peng

remained firm on his position and began to rebuild his forces.

金日成对彭德怀元帅拒绝继续攻击失败的敌人非常不满,宣称中国军队夸大了他们的问题(和困难). 没搭理金日成的爆发,彭德怀元帅坚持自己的意见(没有出击)并开始重组他的军队.

看完的感觉是老美对中国军队的了解非常细致,包括后勤洪学智和东北高岗的支持,也详细描述了中国军队的五次战役过程及其成果.作为美国现役军人的作者,应该是代表了美国军方相当一部分人的观点.供大伙参考.

西行的风 · 发表于 2011-12-21 01:06:50

摘自“朝鲜战争:中国的介入" by Harry M. Crocker.作者是美军上士,就职于路易斯安娜州第二装甲步兵团情报分析部门.上士对美国空军和中国的后勤补给有很具体的分析，对中国军队的评估和弱点分析对今天的中国军队和美国军人都是有借鉴意义的。

原文很长，我这里直接给出我的节选翻译和评论：

1。美国空军对中国军队的打击评估（注：看到这里确实体会到落后就要挨打的窝囊，志愿军的渗透穿插包围战术非常有杀伤力，但火力和后勤不足，空军力量的落后，极大地限制了这些中国儿女最优秀代表的战果。正因为如此，通过美方的视角，才能深深体会到新中国的儿女们是多么勇敢和富有智慧。）

Throughout these offensive operations in Korea, the Chinese were plagued by UNC air

power. UNC air strikes proved extremely effective at inflicting casualties on the CPVF. On December 30, 1950, a UNC air raid reduced two regiments of the Chinese 1st Artillery Division to twenty-four guns when it caught them in movement. 228 During the 3rd offensive, Hong Xuezhi also reported to Zhou Enlai that the CPVF had, suffered extremely heavy losses to enemy air raids.

在朝鲜战场上，中国军队的所有攻击作战饱受美国空军的阻挠并深受其害。美国空军对中国军队的杀伤特别有效。比如说，1950年12月30日，美国空军的一次突然袭击毁灭了运动中的中国军队第一炮兵师两个炮兵团，后者只有24门大炮幸存下来。在中国军队的第三次战役中，洪学智向周恩来总理报告说：由于美国的空袭，中国军队遭受了非常惨重的损失。

UNC air strikes also succeeded in crippling the CPVFs logistical support of its combat

formations. During the 4th offensive, the UNC had reduced the CPVFs material re-supply by

60-70 percent. By April 1951, the CPVF supply lines, which had achieved a length of 300-400

kilometers, suffered continual disruption and CPVF engineers were unable to keep the Yalu

River bridges operational due to UNC air strikes. UNC air raids also caused CPVF supply units to lose contact with the combat formations and further delayed the delivery of much-needed supplies. Though the Chinese expanded their air forces in response, they were unable to project this air power to the forward battle areas. The same UNC air strikes, which impeded the resupply of CPVF combat formations, rendered the Chinese incapable of supplying fuel and ammunition to forward air bases in quantities sufficient to support forward basing of their fighter aircraft. As a result, they were forced to remain in the rear, where they could not provide effective air cover.

美国空军的袭击也成功的破坏了中国军队战斗集群的后勤网络。在中国军队的第四次战役中，由于美国空军的打击，中国军队的后勤补给下降了60-70%。到1951年四月，中国军队的后勤补给线，延伸到300-400公里，（由于美国空军的攻击），遭受了持续性的毁坏，中国军队的工程兵一直无法修复鸭绿江大桥。美国空军的空袭导致中国军队的后勤单位无法供给前线部队，尤其延误了前线急需的补给。尽管中国相应延伸了中国空军的活动范围，但却无法投射到前线战斗区域。美国空军，不仅阻止了中国军队战斗单位的后勤补给，也限制了中国空军的油料和弹药补给向前线输送。结果是，中国空军不得不呆在后方，从而无法给前线中国军队提供掩护。

Reduced supply had a concomitant effect on combat operations. Not only did CPVF

units find it impossible to sustain their offensive operations without rations, but they also suffered grievous casualties due to exposure to the elements. The effects of the CPVFs inability to provide adequate winter clothing reached critical proportions during the 3rd offensive. Cold weather injuries rendered the entire Chinese 586th Infantry Regiment (196th Infantry Division)

combat ineffective. The 116th Infantry Division suffered over 2,000 casualties to exposure.

Many other regiments and battalions also reported they were combat ineffective and some

divisions reported that the extreme cold had reduced them to 50 percent strength. The

resulting losses to exposure, and the Chinese failure to provide replacements in a timely manner, greatly extended the time required for the reconstitution of CPVF combat formations. This proved to have an increasingly detrimental impact on Chinese operations as the war dragged on.

补给的下降直接影响到了作战能力。中国军队各单位发现没有给养，他们不但无法持续进攻作战，也因此遭受巨大的非战斗伤亡。由于没有冬季服装，在中国军队的第三次作战中，严寒的杀伤效应及其严重。这直接导致中国军队196步兵师的586团失去了作战效能。116步兵师由于缺乏冬装损失高达2000余人。很多中国军队的师团报告说他们没有办法战斗，有的单位损失高达50%。严寒导致的非战斗伤亡和前线部队无法按时替换，都严重延误了前线部队的战斗力恢复。随着战争的持续，这对中国军队作战行动的破坏越来越严重。

Lack of sufficient ammunition further exacerbated the CPVFs inferiority in firepower

and directly affected the outcome of its offensives by greatly reducing its abilities to annihilate enemy formations. Though the Chinese proved highly adept at infiltrating and isolating UNC units, they were rarely able to eliminate them.This deficiency manifests itself again and again throughout the Chinese 3rd, 4th and 5th offensives.

缺少足够的弹药补给进一步恶化了中国军队火力上的劣势地位，也直接影响到中国军队进攻作战的成果，极大的削弱了中国军队歼灭敌人战斗部队的能力。尽管中国军队有高超的穿插包围联合国军队的能力和技巧，他们却很少有机会歼灭敌人。这个缺陷，在中国人第三，第四和第五次进攻性战役里，越来越突出。

During the 3rd offensive, the Chinese 39th Army isolated the ROKA 1st Infantry Division

but was unable to either eliminate it or prevent its withdrawal. The Chinese 39th and 40th Armies experienced the same result in their confrontation with the ROKA 6th Infantry Division. The CPVF did achieve some successes, though these would be the last victories of this type for some time to come. The British 29th Brigade suffered the loss of thirty-one tanks as a result of their encounter with the Chinese 149th Infantry Division. The Chinese 42nd and 66th Armies succeeded in eliminating the 31st and 32nd ROKA Regiments (ROKA 2nd Infantry Division), as well as a regiment of the ROKA 5th Infantry Division. They also captured over sixty ROKA artillery pieces.

在第三次中国军队发起的攻击作战中，39军孤立了韩国第一步兵师，但却未能歼灭也未能阻止他们的逃脱。中国军队39和40军在和韩国第六步兵师作战时再一次尝到同样的苦涩结果。中国军队确实获得了一些成功，但在之后，这些胜利将会是最后一次。这些战绩有，英国第29旅被志愿军149步兵师攻击并损失了31辆坦克。中国军队的42和66军也成功歼灭了韩国第二步兵师的31和32团，附加韩国第五步兵师的一个团。他们还缴获了至少60门韩国军队的火炮。

The 4th and 5th offensives saw no CPVF elimination of any major UNC combat

formations. Though the CPVF captured 7,800 UNC soldiers, it allowed the U.S. 2nd Infantry

Division, as well as the ROKA 3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions to escape. The battle for Chipyongni is the most prominent example of the CPVFs failure to pin and destroy UNC units. The 23rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, with the support of a battalion of French infantry, an artillery battalion and twenty tanks, successfully resisted all CPVF attempts to reduce its positions. Finally, during the 5th offensive, the combined forces of the 20th CPVF Army and the NKPA 5th Corps isolated the ROKA 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions but failed to eliminate them prior to their escape.

中国军队第四和第五次战役没有获得任何突出的歼灭联合国军队的记录。尽管中国军队俘虏了7800名联合国军人，美军第二步兵师，韩国第三和第五步兵师都成功逃跑。邸平里战斗是一个经典战役，这里中国军队没有钉住并消灭联合国军。美军第23步兵团，在一个法国步兵营的支援下，依靠一个炮兵营和20辆坦克，成功的顶住了中国军队所有的攻势。最后，在中国军队的第五次战役中，中国军队20军和朝鲜人民共和国第五军团又一次孤立了韩国第五和第七步兵师，但再一次在歼灭前让他们逃脱。

These deficiencies were the direct result of Maos exaggeration of CPVF and NKPA

abilities. Likewise, he grossly under estimated the abilities of the UNC. Though Peng and his

subordinate commanders quickly developed a healthy respect for the UNC forces opposing them, Mao refused to acknowledge the CPVFs difficulties and continued to urge them on. The result was an ever-increasing reduction in the combat capabilities of the CPVF at a time when China needed these qualities most. The UNCs expanding forces and capabilities now forced China to the negotiating table.

这些缺陷是毛泽东主席高估了中国和朝鲜军队能力的直接结果。同样的，他也严重低估了联合国军的作战能力（注：作者很有趣，引用了毛的说法：纸老虎，paper tiger和走狗，running dog，在介绍部分）。尽管彭德怀元帅和他的下属指挥官们很快（承认并）尊重作为敌人的联合国军（注：其实是美军），但毛拒绝承认中国军队面对的困难并持续要求（进攻），结果是中国军队作战能力的不断丧失，尤其是当中国最需要这些高质量军人的时候。联合国军膨胀的力量和能力现在迫使中国不得不坐在谈判桌前。

点评一下：主席对朝鲜战场的醒悟要远远比上士先生说得来的快的多，主席后期的指示是 “零敲牛皮糖”,主席和彭总确实意识到由于火力的差距，我方一口吃掉美军的整团整师不现实。五次战役后我方的战术战斗特点是有很大改变的。这个大概被上士视而不见了。当然，作为失败的一方，这么说一下是完全可以理解的。

对上士论文的概要总结就此结束。

现在我提一下对台湾海峡未来战争的描述：

按照上士的说法，美国是尊重中国陆军的陆权的，“中国军队有高超的穿插包围联合国军队的能力和技巧，他们却很少有机会歼灭敌人”，今天的中国军队未必缺少火力。后勤也未必是大问题，台湾的天气让美国指望严寒的帮忙也不现实，美军最大的优势就是海军和空军。作者原文还提到中国军队在朝鲜发起五次战役的原因是害怕美军的两栖登陆，不得不以攻为守。

但对于中国军队来讲，最可怕是美国的空中优势和海上力量，对美国人来说，这个优势即使是60年后的今天，还是没有变。假设中国军队登陆台湾后，美国如果切断并攻击大陆的登陆舰艇，中国军队的火力和后勤支援恐怕未必比朝鲜战场好多少，恐怕还会更恶劣。因为没有朝鲜战场的陆地和山野，割断海峡甚至可以来得更简单。美国空军和海军是可以让大陆一线部队陷入弹尽粮绝的处境的，美国不会忽略它的空军对大陆后继部队的杀伤和隔断作用。假想一下，38， 39 和40军被歼灭的后果，恐怕任何一个大陆领导人都只有倒台的下场。

其实对我方最简单的方法是：我们还是有陆权的，朝鲜，伊朗，阿富汗都还是可以交换点东西的。那里的美军可以做人质。毛主席说你打你的，我打我的。所以，我的建议是38，39和40军可以用在东北亚和中亚方向的。

对大陆来说，台湾海峡拖一下是没有坏处的。从纯军事角度讲，现在我们仍然没有走处朝鲜战争的影响。

西行的风 · 发表于 2011-12-21 01:07:55

西行的风发表于 2011-12-21 01:06 4 r# h% j3 L9 l! g8 w' R9 L
摘自“朝鲜战争:中国的介入" by Harry M. Crocker.作者是美军上士,就职于路易斯安娜州第二装甲步兵团情报分 ...

老兵回忆之一：长津之战 by Jack Clifton Burkett.

背景介绍：Jack在1929年生于Clifton，Kentucky洲. 朝鲜战争爆发后，1950年，Jack从San Diego转道日本，作为美国海军陆战队第一师第三营的一名列兵，登陆朝鲜半岛。

1。Jack眼中的中国军队和攻击

As to the strength of the enemy, I can only assume the estimates I later read about are correct. There were said to have been about eight Chinese divisions. Most of the enemy wore padded, quilted, cotton coats and hats that had flaps that covered their ears. On many occasions, tennis shoes were the only protection for their feet. I assume their suffering from the cold was much worse than what we experienced. In fact, I do not know how they kept from freezing to death or suffering severe frostbite, which many did. Many that were taken prisoner had the worst cases of frostbite ever seen. Even for a hated enemy one had to feel sorry for them.

（当海军陆战队开始撤退）对于敌人（志愿军）的数量，我只能假定我后来读到的评估是正确的。据报道说有八个中国师。他们大多数穿着有夹心的棉袄和有护翼的棉帽.而且很多人只有网球鞋（注：当时的温度是严寒零下30到40度）。我断定他们受严寒的折磨远远超过我们。实际上，我真不知道他们是怎么防止冻伤以至于死亡的。很多被抓获的志愿军战俘所受过的冻伤是我从来没看过的，非常严重。甚至作为他们的敌人，都会替他们难过（注：如果不是朝鲜北部极端的天气严寒，以中国军队20军，27军的实力，前者善于穿插攻击，后者善于防守，感兴趣的可以搜索一下军史，陆战一师肯定会死的很难看，天气是帮了敌人大忙）。

The weapons they used were a mixture of anything they could find. The most irritating situation was finding dead Chinese with Thompson submachine guns. These were American-made weapons being used by the enemy against us. We had apparently given the Chinese these weapons at some prior time. It could have been World War II or during the communist take-over, having then been lost by soldiers to Shang Kai Shek. It is also possible that some of them were provided by the Russians, being given to the Russians by us in World War II. Finally, it is possible that an American company sold them to China.

他们使用的武器也是五花八门。最让人生气的是发现冻死的志愿军战士身边的Thompson冲锋枪。志愿军用美国制造的武器攻击美国人（注：Jack大概无视或是不知道美国在中国内战中的军援杀死多少无辜的中国人）。很明显早些时候我们支援了中国人这些武器。他们可能是二战时美国的援助，或者美国在中国内战的军援，被蒋介石的士兵丢给了共产中国。甚至可能来自苏联二战时从美国得到的军援。最后，当然也有可能是美国公司卖给中国人的（注：看来Jack对美国商人没好感）。

Even as much as we hated these enemy soldiers, one had to admire their courage. They kept moving forward toward our defenses even into almost certain death. I assume, however, that they would have been killed by their leaders if they had not. Their method of fighting was almost exclusively to sneak or crawl up to our lines in the dark and hope to overrun us in the confusion. They felt that this would terrorize us by not knowing where they were or in what number. They were willing to sacrifice untold numbers in order to make this method of fighting successful.

即使作为非常憎恨敌人的我们，也不得不承认他们的勇气。他们即使知道自己会战死也毫无畏惧勇于向前。我猜，可能他们不进攻，也会死在自己的督战队手上，才这么勇敢（注：美国人是无法理解一个新生的，在毛泽东彭德怀领导下的，新型军队，对于胜利的渴望，以及她的光荣，勇敢和自豪）。他们总是在晚上，偷偷渗透和爬行，企图迷惑并消灭我们。他们觉得这样会让我们搞不清他们的数量和位置，从而吓倒我们。他们不顾一切，即使牺牲自己，只为获得胜利或者杀死我们（注：作为中国军队指挥官，只能尽可能利用我方的优势：无畏，近战，夜战和集中火力，后者尤其重要，既然我方的火力和钢铁投射在当时根本没有可能和美军比，这点美国作为物质丰富火力强大的军队是无法理解的，如果可能，没有那个军队会把生命不当回事，美军士兵的回忆常让我想起，何不食肉糜）。

2。一个纪念品。

An hour or so after the sun came up, we ventured out to see if there were any living Chinese. I could only see frozen bodies. On one of them nearest to me, and therefore one I could have killed since he was closest to my position, I saw a pocket watch. I took it from his body for a souvenir and I still have it today. It has a Chinese inscription inside the front cover. Someday I intend to have it interpreted. On the inside of the back cover it reads, "International Dispensary Shanghai." He may have worked for a dispensary that we had established there at some time in the past. The back of it reads "15 Rubis-J. Ullmann & Co.-Shanghai." Below that is another Chinese inscription.

（在长津某个夜晚，中国人攻击撤退后,）当太阳升起一个小时后，我们出来看看有没有活着的中国士兵。我能看到只有冻僵的遗体。在离我战斗位置最近的地方，因而可能是被我杀死的中国士兵中的一个，我看到一个怀表。我取下来作为纪念，现在也还在（注：是我军连队指挥官的可能很大，也可能是新参军的上海青年，20军和27军在上海有新兵）。它前面表盖上有汉字铭文。也许有一天我会找人翻译一下。在表后盖上刻着：上海国际药房。也许阵亡者曾经在我方（美国）建立的药房工作过。表的后面还刻有 "15 Rubis-J. Ullmann & Co.-Shanghai."字样，下面还有汉字铭文。

3.关于美国的空军支援

We received air, tank, and artillery support. The air support at all times was a tremendous advantage to us. Our fighter planes completely dominated the skies. The enemy seldom fought in the daytime, probably due to our air superiority as well as our superior weapons and fire-power. Another type of "air support" was in the form of helicopters. This was the major means of transporting our wounded to medical facilities. They were strapped to the outside of the helicopter on their stretchers. This was used by all units to move our wounded.

我们有空军，坦克，大炮的支援。空军在所有时间是我方的极大优势。我方的战斗机完全统治了天空。结果是敌人在白天很少开展战斗行动，这很可能由于我方的空中打击，炮兵火力和更好的武器所致。其他的空中支援也包括直升机。他们主要用于运输伤员到医院。伤员们被放在担架上然后用带子捆在直升机外边。直升机几乎被所有单位用于运送伤员。

4。结语

When I had the chance to reflect on what I had just been through, I was sad and depressed to think of all the Marines that were killed in the Chosin Reservoir. I wondered why in the hell we were in this god-forsaken land in the first place. I was also unhappy with the thought that we had been driven back by the enemy. At that time I would never have believed that this could happen to Marines。

当我有机会反思我所经历的一切，当我想起在长津之战中阵亡的海军陆战队队员, 我非常难过和压抑。我首先想知道为什么我们会到这个上帝遗忘的地方去战斗。当我想到我们是被敌人赶走时我也很不高兴。那个时候真的让我难以置信这个（失败）会发生在美国海军陆战队身上（注：如果天气暖和点，如果26军及时赶到，20军和27军后勤稍微好点，如果炮兵稍微多点，如果不是想全歼敌人的话，任何一种可能，陆战队一师都要到大霉。恐怕就轮不到作者感叹了）。

名词解释：

长津之战：中国人民志愿军第九兵团在长津湖战斗中共歼灭美军13900余人（战斗伤亡）。第九兵团战斗减员19202人，冻饿减员28954人；减员总数48156人。减员数量为全兵团兵员总数的32.1%。也就是说，全兵团每3个人中就有1个人牺牲或负伤。第二十军冻伤最为严重，营连排三级干部大部分被冻伤所致坏疽致残致亡。美国陆战第一师自己统计，侥幸逃脱包围后，有着24124名官兵的美陆战第一师战斗减员4418人，冻伤减员7313人，减员总数为11731人。减员数量为全师兵员总数的40%。加上美步兵第七师、步兵第三师及其它部队的损失。作战结果：联合国军美第十军伤亡惨重，演成全线大溃退；中国人民志愿军第九兵团进攻，基本实现战役目标，尽管伤亡大于敌人，但完成了最初的战略任务。

西行的风 · 发表于 2011-12-21 01:08:26

西行的风发表于 2011-12-21 01:07
0 W5 B. o. E* a- Y老兵回忆之一：长津之战 by Jack Clifton Burkett.6 k5 \: j$ `) K" T# S9 f3 `" h! S
% O, n" b4 X5 N- |" ~! r
背景介绍：Jack在1929年生于Clifton，Kentucky洲. ...

口述者： James Calvin DeLong。生于1931年Pennsylvania。驻日美军机枪组组长。朝鲜战争爆发后突击提拔为中士。1950年加入美军第七步兵师31团3营K群机枪组。参加过仁川登陆和长津湖战役，而后被我志愿军俘虏。1953年释放回美。

省略部分概述： Mr. Delong在长津湖地区Hill 1221（注：一个小高地，具体位置大概在长津水库北面）于1950年12月1日企图撤退时被俘。

They put us in a ditch and made us kneel down. I thought they were going to kill us at that point. There might have been 20 or 30 of us in the ditch at that time, and the Chinese stood around us with Thompson submachine guns. They kept us there for about an hour. It was cold so it seemed like an hour anyway. It seemed like an eternity when we were down there with our hands tied behind our back. After a while a Chinaman came running up the road and handed this other one a note. Apparently it was an order. He read it and then they untied our hands, took us out in the road, and started marching us back through. I felt that once we get off the front line, we had a much better chance of surviving. I figured that those guys were like us. We Americans were not always humane when it came to treatment of prisoners of war. We killed prisoners, too. When we pulled out of that one area at Chosin where we had prisoners in the house, we opened the doors and threw white phosphorus in on the prisoners. I didn't personally do it, but I saw others in the 31st Infantry Regiment do it. They didn’t release them. They just threw the white phosphorus on them and burned the house. Don’t ask me why they did it, but they did. I was sure hoping that the Chinese didn’t do that to us when I was taken prisoner. One looks at life a little differently when he is the prisoner.

志愿军战士把我们带到路旁的水沟里，然后让我们跪下。在那个时候，我以为我们要被处决。水沟里大概有20到30个美军士兵，志愿军战士手拿Thompson冲锋枪（大概是20军或者27军的战士，他们在淮海战役缴获不少美式装备）站在旁边。天气如此的冷，可能过了一个小时（也可能不是）。我们手被捆在背后，似乎要永远呆在沟里。终于一个中国士兵从公路跑步过来，递给等候的士兵一个便条。很明显这是个命令。读完命令后，我们的手被解开，带上公路，并开始向后方进发。我预感我们一旦离开前线，应该有很大机会活下去。我也明白这些人和我军一样，我军（指美国军队）对于战俘并不总是实行人道主义。我们杀俘虏。当我们从长津撤退的时候，我们31步兵团对被关在屋子里的俘虏（是这样的），拉开门，投入白磷燃烧弹。我本人没有这样作过。但我确实看见其他人这样干。这些俘虏没有被释放，他们被投入白磷燃烧弹然后被关在屋子里烧死（注：可能是朝鲜人民军和平民，但我觉得也有可能有志愿军战俘）。不要问我为什么他们会这么做，但他们确乎有人这样干。我希望我作为战俘，不要被这样对待。（我知道）当一个人成为俘虏的时候他看待生命的态度可能会有些不一样（注：你希望别人怎么对待你，你也应该这样对待别人，看别人杀人而不停止，这位也不是什么好人）。

关于伙食和志愿军看守

We got maybe two meals a day if we were lucky. We very seldom ever got what I considered white rice. At Camp 10 we never had any meat of any kind that I can remember. We also didn't have any fruit.

我们如果幸运的话，会一日两餐。我们几乎没有吃到白米饭（注：考虑到志愿军的炒面就雪水，而且还经常吃不上，我不能不感叹我方对战俘的仁慈）。在10号战俘营，我们没有任何肉可吃。我们也没有水果（注：看到这里，笔者只能说美军的后勤很好，然后，这位一点被俘虏的自觉都没有）。

I never became friends with any of my captors, although some of our guards treated us good and we could bum a cigarette from them every once in a while. I was able to do that. We all did it. We had one guard who could speak a little English and he was with us pretty long. He was a Chinaman. He was fairly old. He had been in Chiang Kai-shek's army but then he came over to the Communists. The Chinese had a lot of troops in Korea who had fought for Chiang Kai-shek. They were all seasoned troops with a lot of battle experience. The older ones were kept back with the prisoners. We had one Chinese interpreter named Pam. He was a Harvard graduate. A smart cookie. He was a political commissar. He had more power than a regimental commander in the army. When he spoke, they moved. What he wanted he got. He had a lot of weight. We called him "Lieutenant Pam." He was around us for quite a while.

我没有和任何看守做朋友，尽管有些看守确实对我们不错。我们可以不时从他们那里讨根烟抽。我这么做过。我们每个人都要过。有一个守卫会一些英语，他曾经在蒋介石的军队干过然后投奔加入共产党军队，已经相当老了。他和我们呆了很长一段时间。实际上很多共产党军队的士兵都曾经为蒋介石服务过。他们都是老兵而且富有战斗经验。一些岁数大的就留下来看守我们。还有一个翻译，我们叫他中尉Pam. 他从哈佛毕业，非常聪明，是看守营的政治委员。在看守部队里，他甚至比团长还有权。他命令，人们执行。他能得到任何他想要的。他很胖，和我们在一起待了很久（注：美军的战俘集中营也有翻译，但他们的角色和凶残我不想提了。只能再次感叹志愿军对美军战俘的仁慈）。

We were never punished at Camp 10. They just tried to brainwash us and to interrogate us. If we didn't give them the answers they thought were the right ones, they got a little tough with us, but normally I didn’t have any really bad treatment there. I mean, we might have been hit with a rifle butt or something, but nothing other than that. I don’t consider that bad treatment. I just consider that as part of the routine of being a prisoner--getting hit and being moved around.

在10号营地，我们从来没有被惩罚过。他们只是试图给我们洗脑或是询问我们。如果他们认为我们没有回答出他们想要的东西，他们会变得严厉些，但一般来说我们没有受到任何真正的虐待。我是说，我们顶多被枪托砸几下，这就是最大的惩罚。我不认为那是虐待。我以为，作为一个俘虏，被打几下然后到处转移是很正常的事情。

Mr. DeLong作为战俘，在1953年被释放，然后回到美国。他于1955年结婚，后来有一个女儿和儿子。

注：考虑到我方战俘在美军集中营的待遇。我只能说我们太仁慈。Mr. DeLong所属部队用白磷燃烧弹虐杀战俘. 至于没有把直接杀死的，也好不到那里去。记录我方战俘待遇和被强制转移到台湾的报道已经太多。我就不一一转述。

我的一个结论是：象焦国标这样愿意被‘自由’‘民主’的美军巡航导弹炸死的人，应该很乐意尝试被‘自由’‘民主’的美军白磷燃烧弹灼烧吧，或是被‘自由’‘民主’的国民党特务在身体上刻下反共复国的字眼，作为他的信仰，他也应该很乐意。祝焦先生在美国得尝所愿。

最后，祝福归国或是流落台湾的志愿军战俘，希望他们有个幸福的晚年。也希望他们有回忆和口述留下。让后人铭记。

新梅老妖 · 发表于 2011-12-22 13:28:32

最近在看李奇微的自传，发现老美的总司令的政治水平也很低，不理解中国人为什么不怕死。
如果我们的军队有美军的装备，很期待毛泽东军事思想会衍化出什么样的军事水准。

黯影 · 发表于 2012-1-3 18:13:31

本帖最后由黯影于 2012-1-3 18:55 编辑

那个米国大兵真二，难道还让主席公开讲话里说美军是niubility之师？

		自动登录	找回密码
密码			注册

[战史] 继续搬家-美国视角1: 中国在朝鲜战争中的角色

点评