The Economist： China v America，The end of engagement

龙血树

China v America
The end of engagement
How the world’s two superpowers have become rivals


Print edition | Leaders
Oct 18th 2018

For the past quarter century America’s approach to China has been founded on a belief in convergence. Political and economic integration would not just make China wealthier, they would also make it more liberal, pluralistic and democratic. There were crises, such as a face-off in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 or the downing of a spy-plane in 2001. But America cleaved to the conviction that, with the right incentives, China would eventually join the world order as a “responsible stakeholder”.

Today convergence is dead. America has come to see China as a strategic rival—a malevolent actor and a rule-breaker (see Briefing). The Trump administration accuses it of interfering in America’s culture and politics, of stealing intellectual property and trading unfairly, and of seeking not just leadership in Asia, but also global dominance. It condemns China’s record on human rights at home and an aggressive expansion abroad. This month Mike Pence, the vice-president, warned that China was engaged in a “whole-of-government” offensive. His speech sounded ominously like an early bugle-call in a new cold war.

Do not presume that Mr Pence and his boss, President Donald Trump, are alone. Democrats and Republicans are vying to outdo each other in bashing China. Not since the late 1940s has the mood among American businessfolk, diplomats and the armed forces swung so rapidly behind the idea that the United States faces a new ideological and strategic rival.

At the same time, China is undergoing its own change of heart. Chinese strategists have long suspected that America has secretly wanted to block their country’s rise. That is partly why China sought to minimise confrontation by “hiding its strengths and biding its time”. For many Chinese the financial crisis of 2008 swept aside the need for humility. It set America back while China thrived. President Xi Jinping has since promoted his “Chinese Dream” of a nation that stands tall in the world. Many Chinese see America as a hypocrite that commits all the sins it accuses China of. The time to hide and bide is over.

This is deeply alarming. According to thinkers such as Graham Allison of Harvard University, history shows how hegemons like the United States and rising powers like China can become locked into a cycle of belligerent rivalry.

America fears that time is on China’s side. The Chinese economy is growing more than twice as fast as America’s and the state is pouring money into advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and biotech. Action that is merely daunting today—to stem the illegal acquisition of intellectual property, say, or to challenge China in the South China Sea—may be impossible tomorrow. Like it or not, the new norms governing how the superpowers will treat each other are being established now. Once expectations have been set, changing them again will be hard. For the sake of mankind, China and America need to come to a peaceful understanding. But how?

Mr Trump and his administration have got three things right. The first is that America needs to be strong. It has toughened the rules on takeovers, to give more weight to national security. It has extradited an alleged Chinese intelligence officer from Belgium. It has increased military spending (though the extra money going to Europe still dwarfs that going to the Pacific). And it has just boosted foreign aid in order to counter lavish Chinese investment abroad (see article).

Mr Trump is also right that America needs to reset expectations about Chinese behaviour. Today’s trading system fails to prevent China’s state-backed firms from blurring the line between commercial interests and the national interest. Government money subsidises and protects companies as they buy up dual-use technology or skew international markets. China has used its state-directed commercial clout in smaller countries to influence foreign policy in, say, the European Union. The West needs transparency about the funding of political parties, think-tanks and university departments.

Third, Mr Trump’s unique ability to signal his disregard for conventional wisdom seems to have been effective. He is not subtle or consistent, but as with Canadian and Mexican trade, American bullying can lead to dealmaking. China will not be so easily pushed around—its economy depends less on exports to America than Canada’s and Mexico’s do and Mr Xi cannot afford meekly to disavow his Chinese Dream in front of his people. Yet Mr Trump’s willingness to disrupt and offend has already wrong-footed China’s leaders, who thought they could count on America being unwilling to rock the boat.

For what comes next, however, Mr Trump needs a strategy, not just tactics. A starting point must be to promote America’s values. Mr Trump acts as if he believes that might is right. He shows a cynical disdain for the values America enshrined in global institutions after the second world war. If he follows that course America will be diminished as an idea and as a moral and political force. When America competes with China as a guardian of a rules-based order, it starts from a position of strength. But any Western democracy that enters a ruthless race to the bottom with China will—and should—lose.

The strategy should leave room for China to rise peacefully—which inevitably also means allowing China to extend its influence. That is partly because a zero-sum attempt at containment is likely to lead to conflict. But it is also because America and China need to co-operate despite their rivalry. The two countries are more commercially intertwined than America and the Soviet Union ever were. And they share responsibilities including—even if Mr Trump denies it—the environment and security interests, such as the Korean peninsula.

And America’s strategy must include the asset that separates it most clearly from China: alliances. In trade, for example, Mr Trump should work with the eu and Japan to press China to change. In defence Mr Trump should not only abandon his alliance-bashing but bolster old friends, like Japan and Australia, while nurturing new ones, like India and Vietnam. Alliances are America’s best source of protection against the advantage China will reap from its increasing economic and military power.

Perhaps it was inevitable that China and America would end up rivals. It is not inevitable that rivalry must lead to war.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "China v America"

龙血树

经济学人对华态度是右倾的，不欣赏的，但也代表许多西方精英观点，可做参考。下文是国内的翻译：https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=48075&s=zwyess

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最新一期《经济学人》封面文章：中美贸易摩擦会不会走向战争？

隐德莱希

西狩获麟  

封面图不得不说确实很有“创意”。制图一直是《经济学人》的拿手好戏。文章下面的读者也有很多人在称赞这张图。

一个面目狰狞的龙头，鼻子和脸颊确却代表美国的白头鹰，鹰酱的两只爪子上，其中一个已经没有橄榄了，只有刀剑。龙鹰合为一体，配上文章的主题，很应景。

封面文章的副标题是“How the world’s two superpowers have become rivals”——

世界上的这两个超级大国是怎样一步步变成对手的？



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文章第一段，开篇就讲我们（欧洲）对美国政坛的对华政策需要重新认识。对于封面文章的介绍，试译如下：

不仅彭斯和特朗普现在是一条战线，而且以往我们对美国的两党——共和党和民主党的争斗也要重新认识。以前在外交领域两党分歧往往很大，所以在制定对华政策时给了中国这样一个机会：把其中一个党当杠杆打压另一个，中美双方以此“合作”，乐此不疲。但是现在不一样了，美国的两个党现在达成了一个共识，对现在的中国必须要越来越强硬，打压和抨击的态势越来越明显。

   就在同时，好像中国也在逐渐改变自己的身段。以前的时候中国人很“狡猾”地搞韬光养晦（hiding its strengths and biding its time）。但2008年的经济危机是个转折点，从这一年开始，中国人觉得没必须再藏着掖着以假装谦卑的面目示人。中国梦概念的提出和一带一路倡议，让韬光养晦的时代看似已经结束了，而且中国人认为美国一直在国际场合中把中国当假想敌，搞双标，既然要撕破脸赤膊上阵，那也确实没有必要再遮遮掩掩。

美国人担心，时间站在中国这一边。因为中国的年均经济增长速度依然保持在美国的两倍以上，而且中国在人工智能、量子计算和生物科技领域飞速赶超。现在的美国看似还能咋咋呼呼叫嚷中国人不尊重知识产权，偷窃技术，还能和中国在南海问题上拍桌子，但明天的美国，还能做到这点吗？

有关管控中美两国分歧的新名词层出不穷，对这两个国家来说，保持一种和平态势的理解度是必须的，但如何做到？

特朗普和他的管理团队到目前为止，有三点做得很对：

一 美国必须要保持强大。在设计到国家安全领域，把篱笆扎得更紧了，比如在比利时采取了行动，驱逐了中国的一些情报特工人员。增加了军费开支，而且还增加了美国海外的资金援助，以抵消中国的海外投资项目。

二，美国必须要调整对中国的期待值。中国的企业很多都是国企，以政府为支撑打着商业利益的幌子其实谋取的是国家利益，现在的国际贸易体系被中国钻了空子，让中国的国企踩着线玩的很痛快，政府补贴、采购一些双用（军用民用）的科技产品，扭曲了市场游戏规则。

中国尤其擅长用带有政府背景的企业资金在一些小国施加影响，以小博大。欧盟尤其要防范自己的智库、大学等不能被中国渗透，要对来自中国的资金追加审查透明度的条款。

三，特朗普以一己之力颠覆了原来那些用以制衡中国的传统观点，这些传统观点其实早已被证明效果非常不好。特朗普的言行举止看起来有些反复无常，但他非常明白对华贸易关系跟对加拿大和墨西哥很不同（对这两个国家美国可以搞贸易凌霸），特朗普一些非常规的出击已经开始把中国的领导层搞得手忙脚乱了，中国的政界高层之前还曾一致认为，美国不至于突破底线撕破脸打翻，挑起事端破坏现状（rock the boat）。

特朗普接下来该怎么做？他需要打造一整套战略，而不仅仅是战术体系。起始点就是要提升美国的价值度。特朗普现在正在以一种愤世嫉俗的姿态，抛弃二战后美国人所奉之若神明的一些价值观，但是如果沿着特朗普的这条路走下去，美国人的道德政治力将会越来越弱，最后荡然无存。西方式民主国家如果拉下脸，放到和中国这样一个国家的底线同样的水平去竞争，那最终必然会失败。

特朗普的这个战略需要给中国以和平崛起的空间，允许某种程度上中国扩展自己的国际影响力，因为一个零和游戏规则必然导致双方走向全面对抗。在很多领域中美既是对手也还要合作，现在中美两国的经济关联度要远远超过当时美苏的经济关联度。即便特朗普强硬否认，他内心也不得不承认，在环境保护和半岛问题，中美还需要进一步合作。

而且美国的战略还要再做到一点，就是如何更好地孤立中国。比如说在国际贸易领域，美国需要和日本加强合作抗衡中国，不但要拉拢日澳这些老盟友，还要创建新的朋友圈，比如印度和越南。

也许中美两国的对手竞争关系难以改变，但未必两国最终以战争的方式收场。

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lorry

谢谢分享。