简单的经济学游戏（更新）The Most Dangerous Man in America 三

烟波钓徒

; t- w. B6 h9 G+ r丹尼尔 艾斯伯格1931年生于芝加哥，父母是皈依基督教的犹太人。1946年在一场车祸中，他的父母和妹妹意外丧生。1952年经济学本科优等生毕业以后，艾斯伯格去英国剑桥大学学习了一年，然后继续回哈佛攻读研究生。 1954年，艾斯伯格离开哈佛加入美国海军陆战队第二步兵师，先后担任排长和连长，1957年以预备役中尉退伍。回哈佛继续两年研究后，1959年，他加入兰德公司，主要负责核战略的研究。
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$ }0 V2 [% z7 ?9 v1962年艾斯伯格博士毕业，毕业论文就是本文的实验，艾斯伯格悖论。
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" {* ?- ~7 X7 `# o7 a% p& W# s1964年艾斯伯格加入五角大楼，作为国防部长迈克纳马拉的幕僚。正是他本人像迈克纳马拉报告了东京湾事件。随后他前往越南，负责对越战的研究。1967年，艾斯伯格回到兰德公司，继续在迈克纳马拉属下进行越战相关的战略研究。艾斯伯格拥有极高的安全许可，是极少数可以接触到非常全面的秘密文件的人之一。

1969年，艾斯伯格参加了一次反战活动，听了一次反战人士兰迪 科勒(Randy Kehler)的演讲。当时科勒因为反对征兵法案，即将去坐牢。 艾斯伯格突然顿悟，很多年后他的回忆：

5 j, |0 k' M4 bAnd he said this very calmly. I hadn't known that he was about to be sentenced for draft resistance. It hit me as a total surprise and shock, because I heard his words in the midst of actually feeling proud of my country listening to him. And then I heard he was going to prison. It wasn't what he said exactly that changed my worldview. It was the example he was setting with his life. How his words in general showed that he was a stellar American, and that he was going to jail as a very deliberate choice—because he thought it was the right thing to do. There was no question in my mind that my government was involved in an unjust war that was going to continue and get larger. Thousands of young men were dying each year. I left the auditorium and found a deserted men's room. I sat on the floor and cried for over an hour, just sobbing. The only time in my life I've reacted to something like that.
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) V5 @+ o( o" Y  Y4 EDecades later, reflecting on Kehler's decision, Ellsberg said:

Randy Kehler never thought his going to prison would end the war. If I hadn't met Randy Kehler it wouldn't have occurred to me to copy [the Pentagon Papers]. His actions spoke to me as no mere words would have done. He put the right question in my mind at the right time.
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千年前，《论语·宪问》：“子路宿于石门。晨门曰：‘奚自？’子路曰：‘自孔氏。’曰：‘是知其不可而为之者与？
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: H' D& I! f5 a以下是艾斯伯格在1970年前的简历
  V! m& F8 ^% B# W6 j; Z9 c( VDaniel Ellsberg
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Curriculum Vitae 1958-1970 (pre-Pentagon Papers)
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' N0 t7 Y! g: e4 l% Y$ e7 @. xHarvard University, B.A., Economics, 1948-52 (summa cum laude; Phi Beta Kappa).
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King’s College, Cambridge University, Woodrow Wilson Fellow, 1952-53.

( |6 d& x5 m4 [, rHarvard University, Society of Fellows, 1957-59.

7 d/ T$ ^0 [9 IHarvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1962 (undergraduate and Ph.D. theses on decision-making under uncertainty).

Military Service

) q  h$ t- o$ HOfficer, U.S. Marine Corps: rifle platoon leader, rifle company commander, operations officer, 1954-57. (Voluntarily extended enlistment for 8 months, 1956-57, to serve in Mediterranean during Suez crisis.)
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Government Research, Consulting and Employment 1958-70
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' A8 X" O6 M. s" Q( FRAND Corporation, Santa Monica: Strategic analyst, Economics Department, 1958-64, 1967-70. (RAND is a non-profit research organization; Ellsberg’s work was on contract to the Air Force and, later, the Office of Secretary of Defense).
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Consultant to the Defense Department, State Department and White House on command and control of nuclear weapons and on strategic nuclear war plans, 1961-64; on Vietnam options and lessons, 1967-69:
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9 m9 W& j& {4 }$ t1 [, xTask Force on CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific) Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons, 19589-60.
Joint Staff Study Group on Survivability of National Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons, December 1960.
7 B, i0 `/ e' V4 hSole drafter of the general nuclear war section of the Secretary of Defense Guidance on Basic National Security Policy, 1961 (the highest-level Kennedy Administration policy guidance for the annual operational nuclear war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Consultant on SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan, the strategic nuclear war plan) Options.
) s$ J% F/ z' G: ]  \+ }Consultant to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy on strategic war plans on delegation of Presidential authority to execute nuclear war plans, 1961.
Consultant to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (drafted several major policy speeches, including final draft of Ann Arbor “no cities” speech, 1962, and annual top secret statement to NATO, December, 1963) 1961-63.
% Y) r9 z9 a+ y1 y7 Y( nConsultant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric on strategic nuclear war planning. Reviewed for Mr. Gilpatric the annual Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the annual operational war plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1961-63.
Proposed and drafted the “Gilpatric Speech” at Hot Springs, VA, October 21, 1961, revealing U.S. strategic nuclear superiority, ending Soviet claims of “parity” and Khrushchev’s 1961 pressure on Berlin (but figuring, very regrettably, in Khrushchev’s decision to move medium-range missiles to Cuba in 1961).
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Defense Directorate of Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Task Force on Limited War Research and Development, 1961.
Partridge Task Force (headed by General Partridge, formerly Commander, North American Air Defense Command) on Presidential Command and Control and Devolution of Presidential Authority, 1961.
Consultant to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, State Department, Walt W. Rostow, on Basic National Security Policy, 1962.
" U1 G0 a" N% L1 @Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962: member both of Rostow Working Group on “long-range planning” (two weeks ahead)  and ISA Working Group (preparing invasion plans for the coming week), reporting to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM).
Sole researcher on Interagency Study of Presidential Decision-making in Nuclear Crises, for Policy Planning Council of the State Department, with special clearances higher than Top Secret and with access to high-level files of State Defense Departments, CIA, and Joint Staff, JCS, 1964.
. [0 H% Q0 R: ^( r3 K: O2 ~Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John T. McNaughton, 1964-65 (GS-18: highest Civil Service “super-grade,” civilian equivalent of Lt. General), working primarily on Vietnam policy during the escalation of the war, 1964-65.

0 D' m8 H* D; ]6 r+ u2 @Senior Liaison Office under Edward Lansdale, State Department (FSR-1, State Department equivalent of GS-18), U.S. Embassy, Saigon, South Vietnam, 1965-66. Member of Roles and Missions Study for Mission Council, 1966.

8 T* Q1 q! b6 `% D# z5 r4 YSpecial Assistant to Deputy Ambassador William Porter, U.S. Embassy, South Vietnam, 1967, evaluating pacification (involving considerable field observation of combat operations with ARVN and U.S. units).
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McNamara Task Force on History of U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam, 1945-68 (subsequently known as the Pentagon Papers), 1967-69. Original drafter of volume on 1961 Kennedy decisions. Sole researcher with authorized access to entire 43-volume study, as part of “Lessons of Vietnam” study at RAND Corporation, 1968-69.

( P+ n  }, s) M# m6 yConsultant to Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, December 1968-March 1969. Drafter of Vietnam Options paper (presented to the National Security Council at its first meeting under Nixon) and of National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1, a set of presidential questions and directed studies on Vietnam).

stpearl

Ambiguity Aversion？最近关于这个topic的在asset pricing方面的东西不少。
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