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分享 香港问题无解(转)
热度 3 gordon 2014-10-6 15:53
注:狗屎别碰,到最后还赖你呢。 先看香港经贸概况 http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/%E5%B8%82%E5%A0%B4%E7%92%B0%E5%A2%83/%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E7%B6%93%E8%B2%BF%E6%A6%82%E6%B3%81/etihk/tc/1/1X000000/1X09OVUL.htm 从概况上看似乎形势一片大好,不是小好,真实情况呢? 94 年到中英街玩的时候,印象非常深刻的是:香港居民手持身份证在香港身份通道中英街一侧排队领东西,然后跑步到通道另一侧把东西交给那边等候的人并领取劳务 费,而当时手持边防证的内地人需要挨个查验身份和所携带物品是否涉及走私,也就是说,当时对“可控”(每人携带物品有限)的香港身份走私是默许的。 94、 95年税改还在磨合阶段,国家已经调集了一批专家研究相邻区域税率差对贸易的影响,包括如何控制走私规模,如何让不同阶层的做不同规模生意的人都能因此 (税率差)受益?当时提到最多的是 香港没有养老体系 ,收回后怎么办?超过20%的税率差,对走私适当放水,以及内地税收方面优待港资企业(即使什么都没 有,港资身份出借也可以象执业资格去事务所挂一样收租金)…… 注:香港为什么搞房地产啊,就是因为它没有养老体系。 直到现在,香港第一大支柱产业还是转口贸易,转口贸易需要的几大要素:人才、 资信、税收政策、地理位置。人才因素可以被网络服务取代,资信是香港能被房价绑架的一个重要原因(不动产抵押获得贸易所需资金),但是在阿里系这样的设计 (支付宝本身是国际贸易信用证内贸应用的碎片化,阿里也在探索国际贸易的碎片化)面前, 用资信能力做中介的空间在收窄 (佣金收入很大程度上取决于交易笔 数,特别是对就业的吸纳更依赖交易笔数, 大宗交易佣金比例低,所需劳务少 ,对就业吸纳不利),税收政策和地理位置的优势会被其他沿海城市取代(到处要设置 自贸区和取消外资港资企业优惠政策),传统高薪产业贸易业会受到很大冲击,而这十几年, 香港并未象硅谷那样涌现高科技产业群,导致高薪职位供应不足 ,虽然 房价2013年末才回到1997年高位,但人均居住面积在发达城市垫底,大量年轻人看不到出路,这是占中的深层次原因吧? 有人举香港经贸数 据尤其失业率只有3.3%的数据指这次行动并非出于经济原因 ,还有人指目前经济下行受伤的更多是底层,真的?生意不好的时候,老板通常会比员工承受更大压 力吧?员工反正拿工资,老板的利润不如资本的利息就是亏,这些老板没有去把参加占中行动的孩子领回家(香港高中生读大学比例低,家境不好的很多选择直接就 业),什么原因? 香港曾经想内地输送过不少人才,生产管理、零售、商业地产、广告、IT等等,但因为价格问题,这边通常只签约两年,学会就不续约了,九十年代中期150万一年的零售人才、2000年左右400万一年的商业地产人才,都是香港曾经向内地输入过的。 2000 年时某网BD总监在老总办公室汇报工作时,艺术总监(香港人)进去汇报某事,老总(当时好像是李)说:你7万一个月工资,都够请好多内地人了!当时艺术总 监面红耳赤,BD总监也觉得很尴尬,BD总监那时一个月一万六。看最近新闻忽然想起这事(BD总监2000年底参加沙龙时说的)。 资信、市场、信息、知识的差距都在被填平 ,香港优势是什么?出路是什么? 以 3716美元/月的平均工资(2013年8月31日 - 根据香港劳工统计局),香港需要怎样的产业结构?能吸引怎样的资本?香港人不急,内地急着开自贸区、急着转无烟高科技产业的地区也会着急,大家都找好了客 户,急等政策降税降成本了就停了香港的单子呢,智慧产业(城市、交通、医疗、教育等等)能带来多大生意啊,香港加油!香港挺住!
512 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 《Science》最新文章:对中国审查制度的反演试验
热度 20 九九 2014-8-27 00:12
《Science》最新文章:对中国审查制度的反演试验
《Science》最新的社会科学类research article,略蛋疼 : Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and participant observation 全文链接: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/345/6199/1251722.full PDF: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/345/6199/1251722.full.pdf 还有一个贴心的structured summary, 贴过来: Science 22 August 2014: Vol. 345 no. 6199 DOI: 10.1126/science.1251722 RESEARCH ARTICLE Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and participant observation Gary King1,*, Jennifer Pan1, Margaret E. Roberts2 1Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 2Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA. Introduction Censorship has a long history in China, extending from the efforts of Emperor Qin to burn Confucian texts in the third century BCE to the control of traditional broadcast media under Communist Party rule. However, with the rise of the Internet and new media platforms, more than 1.3 billion people can now broadcast their individual views, making information far more diffuse and considerably harder to control. In response, the government has built a massive social media censorship organization, the result of which constitutes the largest selective suppression of human communication in the recorded history of any country. We show that this large system, designed to suppress information, paradoxically leaves large footprints and so reveals a great deal about itself and the intentions of the government. Rationale Chinese censorship of individual social media posts occurs at two levels: (i) Many tens of thousands of censors, working inside Chinese social media firms and government at several levels, read individual social media posts, and decide which ones to take down. (ii) They also read social media submissions that are prevented from being posted by automated keyword filters, and decide which ones to publish. To study the first level, we devised an observational study to download published Chinese social media posts before the government could censor them, and to revisit each from a worldwide network of computers to see which was censored. To study the second level, we conducted the first largescale experimental study of censorship by creating accounts on numerous social media sites throughout China, submitting texts with different randomly assigned content to each, and detecting from a worldwide network of computers which ones were censored. To find out the details of how the system works, we supplemented the typical current approach (conducting uncertain and potentially unsafe confidential interviews with insiders) with a participant observation study, in which we set up our own social media site in China. While also attempting not to alter the system we were studying, we purchased a URL, rented server space, contracted with Chinese firms to acquire the same software as used by existing social media sites, and—with direct access to their software, documentation, and even customer service help desk support—reverseengineered how it all works. Results Criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are routinely published, whereas posts with collective action potential are much more likely to be censored—regardless of whether they are for or against the state (two concepts not previously distinguished in the literature). Chinese people can write the most vitriolic blog posts about even the top Chinese leaders without fear of censorship, but if they write in support of or opposition to an ongoing protest—or even about a rally in favor of a popular policy or leader—they will be censored. We clarify the internal mechanisms of the Chinese censorship apparatus and show how changes in censorship behavior reveal government intent by presaging their action on the ground. That is, it appears that criticism on the web, which was thought to be censored, is used by Chinese leaders to determine which officials are not doing their job of mollifying the people and need to be replaced. Conclusion Censorship in China is used to muzzle those outside government who attempt to spur the creation of crowds for any reason—in opposition to, in support of, or unrelated to the government. The government allows the Chinese people to say whatever they like about the state, its leaders, or their policies, because talk about any subject unconnected to collective action is not censored. The value that Chinese leaders find in allowing and then measuring criticism by hundreds of millions of Chinese people creates actionable information for them and, as a result, also for academic scholars and public policy analysts.
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