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https://thehill.com/opinion/fina ... -four-times-it-did/
谷歌翻译:
1. 1862 年初美国政府的即期票据违约,原因是财政部试图支付内战的财政困难。作为回应,美国政府开始印刷纯纸币或“美元”,在战争期间,美元相对黄金大幅折价,这尤其取决于联邦军队的军事实力。
2. 美国政府在 1933 年公开违约其黄金债券。美国以明确且完全不含糊的条款承诺债券持有人以金币赎回这些债券。然后它拒绝这样做,而是提供贬值的纸币。此案最终提交至最高法院,最高法院以 5 票对 4 票的结果支持政府在选择违约时拥有违约的主权权力。 “尽管我对这种拒绝履行美国债券的庄严承诺表示遗憾,”多数派成员哈兰·斯通法官写道,“政府通过行使主权权力……使自己免于承担责任, ”展示了向主权国家贷款的经典风险。在“美国违约”一书中,塞巴斯蒂安·爱德华兹 (Sebastian Edwards) 在他关于这一事件的非常有趣的政治历史中得出结论,这是一个“可以原谅的违约”,但显然是一个违约。
3.当时美国政府在 1968 年违约,拒绝履行其明确承诺,将其银券纸币兑换成银元。银票在他们的脸上用任何人都不会误解的语言写着,并且仍然写着:“这证明已经在美利坚合众国财政部存入了一枚银元,可按要求支付给持票人。”很难有比这更明确的承诺了。但是,当持有这些证书的人数多得令人尴尬地要求兑现承诺的银元时,美国政府干脆决定不付款。对于那些相信印在银质证书表面的认证的人:运气不好
4. 第四次违约是 1971 年美国政府违背了根据布雷顿森林协定将外国政府持有的美元兑换成黄金的承诺。由于该承诺是整个布雷顿森林体系的关键,违背它就是该体系的终结。尼克松总统宣布此行为是暂时的:“我已指示 [财政部] 部长康纳利暂时中止美元兑换黄金。”暂停当然成为永久性的,允许美联储今天无限制地印制美元。众所周知,康纳利告诉他心烦意乱的国际同行,“美元是我们的货币,但这是你们的问题。”
原文:
The default on the U.S. government’s demand notes in early 1862, caused by the Treasury’s financial difficulties trying to pay for the Civil War. In response, the U. S. government took to printing pure paper money, or “greenbacks,” which during the war fell to significant discounts against gold, depending particularly on the military fortunes of the Union armies.
The overt default by the U.S. government on its gold bonds in 1933. The United States had in clear and entirely unambiguous terms promised the bondholders to redeem these bonds in gold coin. Then it refused to do so, offering depreciated paper currency instead. The case went ultimately to the Supreme Court, which on a 5-4 vote, upheld the sovereign power of the government to default if it chose to. “As much as I deplore this refusal to fulfill the solemn promise of bonds of the United States,” wrote Justice Harlan Stone, a member of the majority, “the government, through exercise of its sovereign power…has rendered itself immune from liability,” demonstrating the classic risk of lending to a sovereign. In “American Default,” his highly interesting political history of this event, Sebastian Edwards concludes that it was an “excusable default,” but clearly a default.
Then the U.S. government defaulted in 1968 by refusing to honor its explicit promise to redeem its silver certificate paper dollars
for silver dollars. The silver certificates stated and still state on their face in language no one could misunderstand, “This certifies that there has been deposited in the Treasury of the United States of America one silver dollar, payable to the bearer on demand.” It would be hard to have a clearer promise than that. But when an embarrassingly large number of bearers of these certificates demanded the promised silver dollars, the U.S. government simply decided not to pay. For those who believed the certification which was and is printed on the face of the silver certificates: Tough luck.
The fourth default was the 1971 breaking of the U.S. government’s commitment to redeem dollars held by foreign governments for gold under the Bretton Woods Agreement. Since that commitment was the lynchpin of the entire Bretton Woods system, reneging on it was the end of the system. President Nixon announced this act as temporary: “I have directed [Treasury] Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold.” The suspension of course became permanent, allowing the unlimited printing of dollars by the Federal Reserve today. Connally notoriously told his upset international counterparts, “The dollar is our currency but it’s your problem.” |
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