小胖的心思（续）
本帖最后由 晨枫 于 2017-9-5 21:01 编辑小胖一气又爆了6个核装置，国际社会一致认为，这是对世界和平的公然挑战。他疯了。但历史上另一个先例或许值得注意。1998年5月11日，印度一气试爆了3个核装置，两天后的5月13日，印度再次试爆了3个核装置。此后，印度再也没有试爆过核装置，因为印度已经对自己的核武装具有足够的信心，也认为国际社会对印度的核能力应不再存怀疑。建立核威慑的目的达到了。国际社会如今事实承认印度为核武装国家。朝鲜正是要达到这样的目的。核试爆不仅带来严厉的国际政治反应，本身也耗资巨大，没有必要就不必没事爆一个。因此，有理由认为，小胖的核爆可能会告一段落，朝鲜半岛政治局势转入下一个阶段。
朝鲜半岛无核化是国际社会的一致主张，包括中国和俄罗斯在内。但朝鲜半岛的无核化并不是国际社会能决定的，经济制裁或者不制裁，都不能阻止决心已定的朝鲜。在今天继续拘泥于朝鲜半岛无核化已经失去意义。其实，南亚次大陆无核化也是当年国际社会的共同目标，如今已经不提了，因为没有意义了。朝鲜的核技术来自何方，在没有足够证据之前，各方尽可以猜测。当年中国核试验成功后，西方不乏对中国核技术来自苏联的猜测，西方就是不能相信一穷二白的中国竟然能独立研制出核武器。中国的核专家不乏具有西方教育的背景，但中国核技术不是这几个人象牙塔里弄出来的，靠的是一个庞大而有力的团队。不难想象朝鲜专家具有苏联教育背景，更不应该怀疑朝鲜也有一个庞大而有力的团队。核技术的理论门槛在今天已经不是高不可攀的，不能排除朝鲜核技术确实就是土生土长的可能。俄罗斯没有理由帮助朝鲜研制核武器，中国更加没有理由。房子周围长草了，放火烧草在理论上是一个办法，但没人会这么做，理由不言而喻。
苏联的原子弹教学模型在中国核武器研制过程中起到作用，但中国的原子弹不是因为有模型就研制成的。同样，中国的多轴超重型卡车也确实成为朝鲜导弹的载车（简称TEL），这更不表明朝鲜核弹或者导弹采用了中国技术。但可以确定的是，朝鲜还无力自己研制和生产这样的超重型卡车。就是对中国来说，这样的超重型卡车也是一个漫长的故事。这些超重型卡车是如何到了朝鲜，这依然是一个谜。但中国对有多少这样的超重型卡车出口到了朝鲜是清楚的。朝鲜的远程导弹采用机动发射，而TEL必须来自中国，因此中国在某种程度上对朝鲜的导弹力量规模还是有间接控制的，但这是题外话了。
在朝鲜已经成为既成事实的核国家之后，朝鲜的下一步动作才是值得关注的。
朝鲜无疑是独裁国家，但独裁者不意味着不顾百姓死活，因为独裁王朝才最在乎千秋万代、长治久安，而健康的经济、社会环境是长期、稳定的独裁统治的基础。没有独裁者喜欢坐在火山口上，即使为了统治的便利，也需要安抚民众。在冷战时代，朝鲜经济得到苏联的援助，实际生活水平还不错。苏联解体后，援助没有了，朝鲜经济一落千丈，而中国根本无意把朝鲜“养”起来。朝鲜的经济和民生情况有多糟，没有人会比小胖更清楚、更关心。朝鲜需要改革，需要走出经济困境，即使坐在平壤的象牙塔顶上，也不需要多少政治智慧就能看到这一点。但朝鲜的改革目标很明确：巩固（而不是弱化）金家统治。二胖曾经启动过经济改革，很快就放弃了，因为掌控不住方向的改革很可能危及金家统治。这也是很多人怀疑小胖是否有意启动新的经济改革的主要原因。
中国无疑是从计划经济中改革最为成功的。中国经验表明，改革的成功不仅在于目标，更在于有序的过渡。从计划经济向市场经济过渡是艰难的，不仅牵涉到一系列政策，更有执政当局对政治经济社会的基本稳定的掌控。邓小平的“发展是硬道理”人人记得，但他的“稳定压倒一切”就不是人人记得了，但这同样重要。中国的改革道路充满险阻，曾经有过好几个闯关的时刻，在付出巨大代价后闯过来了，但任何失手无疑可能造成远为惨烈的后果。邓小平和TG的威望与执政力无疑是为改革保驾护航的最大力量。
朝鲜的改革浅尝辄止，未必不是因为改革中出现的挑战使得二胖害怕了，感觉控制不住方向了。但这不等于小胖必然就此放弃改革，他只是在打造更加可控的环境而已。
对于小胖来说，需要打造的改革环境中最大的要素是绝对的权威。小胖在组织上早已具有绝对的权威了，但这是由于世袭统治而外加的，并不是他由于个人才能或者成就而带来的，因此是不可靠的，是难以顶住党内的挑战的。小胖对此清楚得很，所以张成泽必须死。二胖也具有同样的问题。
经济起飞可以带来权威，但改革意味着变化，这不是重新粉刷，而是要拆梁换柱的。人还住在里面，每天还要柴米油盐酱醋，没有强有力的控制，还没有改革完，房子就倒了。朝鲜改革需要借助外资，但不管是来自韩国还是中国，单纯借助外资的经济起飞必然伴随着政治改革的压力，压力的方向和性质不同，但短期、直接的结果是一样的：弱化金家统治。要经济改革而不弱化金家统治，只有建立内生的政治权威，这首先需要足以威慑美韩的导弹核武器，确保安全环境。朝鲜的核威慑在一定程度上还针对日本，对中修也是“争气弹”。这是 一举多得的政治资本。
具有核武装的朝鲜基本上保证了金家王朝的生存。只要小胖、小小胖不犯浑，主动自杀，很难想象谁会去主动拉着朝鲜一起跳核深渊。具有基本的安全保障后，威胁金家统治的就只有国内经济和民生了，朝鲜才有条件从“先军政治”中降低调门，至少有条件地裁减常规军备，把部分资源转用到国民经济上来。这肯定不容易，“先军政治”不可避免地导致军内利益集团，这时就需要小胖的政治威望才能压住了。
对外，朝鲜在建立敢打求死的邪恶信用后，任何缓和的姿态只可能受到普遍欢迎。无核化的呼声和要求还会继续，但最后谁都会承认：再要求朝鲜自我解除核武装已经是不可能的了，只有承认现实。韩国可能会邀请美国战术核武器重新进驻，但中国必然强烈反弹，日本也未必欢迎。在最坏情况下，朝鲜半岛建立互相确保摧毁，这已经是比过去朝鲜只能确保三八线以南20-30公里内的互相确保摧毁是决定性的进步了。事实上，朝鲜一直在美国单方面的核摧毁威胁之下，现在整个韩国加上日本和美国西海岸也置于朝鲜摧毁范围内，这是第一次，也根本改变了力量平衡。
朝鲜一直寻求直接与美国谈判和平协议，美国出于政治需要，不可能很快答应，但也无法不相应降低姿态。但有核朝鲜将寻求与韩国统一，这是想多了。朝鲜和韩国都希望统一半岛，但都是在自己主导下的统一。有核的朝鲜不再具有生存危险，很难想象在任何情况下会主动放弃统治；韩国不仅经济、民生远远领先于朝鲜，政体和美国影响也不容许接受金家统治。这与东西德的情况完全不同，东德这栋房子的地基是苏联，苏联因素消失了，东德也就消失了，两德统一水到渠成。甚至可以说，东德的产生是天上掉下来的，东德的消失也是天上掉下来的。朝鲜则不同，即使在大胖时代也是独立的，只是与苏联保持紧密联系而已。任何把朝鲜看成中国小弟的想法，更是想多了。
独立的朝鲜确保了“独”，接下来就要确保“立”。在这种情况下，朝鲜启动有控制的市场经济改革，进入良性循环，就不是不可想象的事了。
朝鲜需要外资。欧资顾不上朝鲜，日资也不一定能克服意识形态和感情上的障碍，美资更难跨越“资助朝鲜穷兵黩武”的舆论障碍。在美资、欧资、日资暂时不会蜂拥而至的情况下，韩资和中资还是可能大量涌入的。帮助朝鲜改善民生，降低朝鲜的好战调门，增加朝鲜的坛坛罐罐，这是符合中国和韩国利益的。小胖如果会打牌的话，甚至可以挑动韩资与中资竞争，促使争相进入朝鲜，抢占地盘。韩中都有足够的理由抢占先机。
那改革开放会导致自由化、非金化吗？这就是小胖真正建立起来的个人威望起作用的时候了，也是对他自己执政能力信心的考验。如果导弹核武器都做不到，那就没有什么能做到了。但他到底怎么想的，只能从日后实际发生的事实反推了。好在3-5年内应该可以看到。
沙发{:189:} 关中农民 发表于 2017-9-6 06:24
沙发
板凳。 灯火辉煌 发表于 2017-9-6 06:42
板凳。
地板{:190:} 地下室呗 一般来讲，外资进入一个地方，是不是要看有没有资源或者市场呢？还要看看风险大不大，朝鲜那里会比我们的东北更好吗？小胖真要搞经济改革能干啥呢？ 下水道:( 问题是时间不够了，土共改革，总设计师说打出20年和平环境，未来能不能有两年和平都不好说～(￣▽￣～)~ 经济改革这条路也不好走。
晨大的论述很有逻辑，但是不能解释二胖为何没有走拥核-改开的道路。
按理说二胖更有能力发展两弹一星，更有能力改开。但是二胖只做了开城工业园一件事，上胖上台就把它关闭了。
阿雷 发表于 2017-9-5 18:28
一般来讲，外资进入一个地方，是不是要看有没有资源或者市场呢？还要看看风险大不大，朝鲜那里会比我们的东 ...
因为起点太低，想赔都赔不了多少，但有的赚的话，就多了。 常挨揍 发表于 2017-9-5 18:39
问题是时间不够了，土共改革，总设计师说打出20年和平环境，未来能不能有两年和平都不好说～(￣▽￣～)~ ...
接下来10年，只要小胖不折腾，和平基本上是有保证的，20年都可能。 xray2100 发表于 2017-9-5 18:46
经济改革这条路也不好走。
那是肯定的，中国这条路走得可叫一个艰难。但帮着朝鲜走出来，符合中国利益，符合韩国利益，更符合朝鲜利益。国际大势实际上是有利于朝鲜的。 五月 发表于 2017-9-5 19:15
晨大的论述很有逻辑，但是不能解释二胖为何没有走拥核-改开的道路。
按理说二胖更有能力发展两弹一星，更 ...
拥核也是要有积累的，二胖还没有走到这一步。而且一开始，二胖可能还对改开有期望，直到发现这是一匹烈马，他没有本事驾驭。 我觉得三胖在自身权位能巩固的情况下，也是愿意看到朝鲜逐步和国际接触的。比如他非常希望和美国签订和平条约，现在意图甩开中国直接和美国对话。
现在说朝鲜改开一定会带来朝鲜崩溃，这个话有点嫌早，是用中国开放到现在的事实，套到刚刚实行改开的朝鲜身上去。实际上，这是不太可能发生的。因为今天中国人的想法，是从改开后用将近40年间逐步走到今天这个程度的。在金三的领导下，朝鲜主动改开，确实朝鲜会发生变化，但是立即崩溃，基本上不会发生。朝鲜的管控比中国严酷得多，社会基本上应该是可控的。假如能坚持40年，金三还在位，改开只能是缓步前行，每一两年都微调。
朝鲜已经是个高压锅，金三也该适时调整战略。如果这个高压锅真的受不住压力崩了，朝鲜最倒霉，中国第二。韩国大赢家，美国第二。 本帖最后由 小米粒 于 2017-9-6 18:07 编辑
南京老萝卜 发表于 2017-9-6 13:24
我觉得三胖在自身权位能巩固的情况下，也是愿意看到朝鲜逐步和国际接触的。比如他非常希望和美国签订和平条 ...
比中国2届换人抢位置的政改强，政局稳定上更有力，执行力更强大，长期性极佳！ 没人敢投资吧，进去就出不来了。
先把咱们的火车皮还了吧{:206:} 南京老萝卜 发表于 2017-9-6 13:24
我觉得三胖在自身权位能巩固的情况下，也是愿意看到朝鲜逐步和国际接触的。比如他非常希望和美国签订和平条 ...
韩国不可能是大赢家啊，光是难民，它就处理不了。 “朝鲜的远程导弹采用机动发射，而TEL必须来自中国，因此中国在某种程度上对朝鲜的导弹力量规模还是有间接控制的，但这是题外话了。”——晨大，朝鲜是否还有部分导弹使用履带底盘的？中国肯定对朝鲜导弹规模有些控制，但不见得能有多大控制吧？ 南京老萝卜 发表于 2017-9-6 13:24
我觉得三胖在自身权位能巩固的情况下，也是愿意看到朝鲜逐步和国际接触的。比如他非常希望和美国签订和平条 ...
金正恩会不会进行大规模的改革开放我不清楚。但是我看的西方报道，他上台后的这几年也进行了一些市场化改革。
As Economy Grows, North Korea’s Grip on Society Is Tested
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy-marketplace.html?mcubz=3
https://static01.nyt.com/images/2017/05/01/world/30NKMARKETS2/30NKMARKETS2-superJumbo.jpg
SEOUL, South Korea — Despite decades of sanctions and international isolation, the economy in North Korea is showing surprising signs of life.
Scores of marketplaces have opened in cities across the country since the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, took power five years ago. A growing class of merchants and entrepreneurs is thriving under the protection of ruling party officials. Pyongyang, the capital, has seen a construction boom, and there are now enough cars on its once-empty streets for some residents to make a living washing them.
Reliable economic data is scarce. But recent defectors, regular visitors and economists who study the country say nascent market forces are beginning to reshape North Korea — a development that complicates efforts to curb Mr. Kim’s nuclear ambitions.
Even as President Trump bets on tougher sanctions, especially by China, to stop the North from developing nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the United States, the country’s improving economic health has made it easier for it to withstand such pressure and to acquire funds for its nuclear program.
While North Korea remains deeply impoverished, estimates of annual growth under Mr. Kim’s rule range from 1 percent to 5 percent, comparable to some fast-growing economies unencumbered by sanctions.
But a limited embrace of market forces in what is supposed to be a classless society also is a gamble for Mr. Kim, who in 2013 made economic growth a top policy goal on par with the development of a nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Kim, 33, has promised his long-suffering people that they will never have to “tighten their belts” again. But as he allows private enterprise to expand, he undermines the government’s central argument of socialist superiority over South Korea’s capitalist system.
There are already signs that market forces are weakening the government’s grip on society. Information is seeping in along with foreign goods, eroding the cult of personality surrounding Mr. Kim and his family. And as people support themselves and get what they need outside the state economy, they are less beholden to the authorities.
“Our attitude toward the government was this: If you can’t feed us, leave us alone so we can make a living through the market,” said Kim Jin-hee, who fled North Korea in 2014 and, like others interviewed for this article, uses a new name in the South to protect relatives she left behind.
After the government tried to clamp down on markets in 2009, she recalled, “I lost what little loyalty I had for the regime.”
Unofficial Activity
Kim Jin-hee’s loyalty was first tested in the 1990s, when a famine caused by floods, drought and the loss of Soviet aid gripped North Korea. The government stopped providing food rations, and as many as two million people died.
Ms. Kim did what many others did to survive. She stopped showing up for her state job, at a machine-tool factory in the mining town of Musan, and spent her days at a makeshift market selling anything she could get her hands on. Similar markets appeared across the country.
After the food shortage eased, the market in Musan continued to grow. By the time she left the country, Ms. Kim said, more than 1,000 stalls were squeezed into it alongside her own.
Kim Jong-il, the father of the North’s current leader, had been ambivalent about the marketplaces before he died in 2011. Sometimes he tolerated them, using them to increase food supplies and soften the blow of tightening sanctions imposed by the United Nations on top of an American embargo dating to the Korean War. Other times, he sought to suppress them.
But since 2010, the number of government-approved markets in North Korea has doubled to 440, and satellite images show them growing in size in most cities. In a country with a population of 25 million, about 1.1 million people are now employed as retailers or managers in these markets, according to a study by the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.
Unofficial market activity has flourished, too: people making and selling shoes, clothing, sweets and bread from their homes; traditional agricultural markets that appear in rural towns every 10 days; smugglers who peddle black-market goods like Hollywood movies, South Korean television dramas and smartphones that can be used near the Chinese border.
At least 40 percent of the population in North Korea is now engaged in some form of private enterprise, a level comparable to that of Hungary and Poland shortly after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the director of South Korea’s intelligence service, Lee Byung-ho, told lawmakers in a closed-door briefing in February.
This market activity is driven in part by frustration with the state’s inefficient and rigid planned economy. North Koreans once worked only in state farms and factories, receiving salaries and ration coupons to buy food and other necessities in state stores. But that system crumbled in the 1990s, and now many state workers earn barely a dollar a month. Economists estimate the cost of living in North Korea to be $60 per month.
“If you are an ordinary North Korean today, and if you don’t make money through markets, you are likely to die of hunger,” said Kim Nam-chol, 46, a defector from Hoeryong, a town near the Chinese border. “It’s that simple.”
‘Competition Is Everywhere’
Before fleeing in 2014, Mr. Kim survived as a smuggler in North Korea. He bought goods such as dried seafood, ginseng, antiques and even methamphetamine, and he carried them across the border to sell in China. There, he used his earnings to buy grain, saccharin, socks and plastic bags and took it back to sell in North Korean markets.
He said he had paid off border guards and security officers to slip back and forth, often by offering them cigarette packs stuffed with rolled-up $100 or 10,000-yen bills.
“I came to believe I could get away with anything in North Korea with bribes,” he said, “except the crime of criticizing the ruling Kim family.”
Eighty percent of consumer goods sold in North Korean markets originate in China, according to an estimate by Kim Young-hee, director of the North Korean economy department at the Korea Development Bank in the South.
But Kim Jong-un has exhorted the country to produce more goods locally in an effort to lessen its dependence on China, using the word jagang, or self-empowerment. His call has emboldened manufacturers to respond to market demand.
Shoes, liquor, cigarettes, socks, sweets, cooking oil, cosmetics and noodles produced in North Korea have already squeezed out or taken market share from Chinese-made versions, defectors said.
Regular visitors to Pyongyang, the showcase capital, say a real consumer economy is emerging. “Competition is everywhere, including between travel agencies, taxi companies and restaurants,” Rüdiger Frank, an economist at the University of Vienna who studies the North, wrote recently after visiting a shopping center there.
A cellphone service launched in 2008 has more than three million subscribers. With the state still struggling to produce electricity, imported solar panels have become a middle-class status symbol. And on sale at some grocery stores and informal markets on the side streets of Pyongyang is a beverage that state propaganda used to condemn as “cesspool water of capitalism” — Coca-Cola.
Leaning On Private Sector
When Kim Jong-un stood on a balcony reviewing a parade in April, he was flanked by Hwang Pyong-so, the head of the military, and Pak Pong-ju, the premier in charge of the economy.
https://static01.nyt.com/images/2017/05/01/world/30NKMARKETS3/30NKMARKETS3-master675.jpg
The formation was symbolic of Mr. Kim’s byungjin policy, which calls for the parallel pursuit of two policy goals: developing the economy and building nuclear weapons. Only a nuclear arsenal, Mr. Kim argues, will make North Korea secure from American invasion and let it focus on growth.
Mr. Kim has granted state factories more autonomy over what they produce, including authority to find their own suppliers and customers, as long as they hit revenue targets. And families in collective farms are now assigned to individual plots called pojeon. Once they meet a state quota, they can keep and sell any surplus on their own.
The measures resemble those adopted by China in the early years of its turn to capitalism in the 1980s. But North Korea has refrained from describing them as market-oriented reforms, preferring the phrase “economic management in our own style.”
In state-censored journals, though, economists are already publishing papers describing consumer-oriented markets, joint ventures and special economic zones.
It is unclear how much of recent increases in grain production were due to Mr. Kim’s policies. Defectors say factories remain hobbled by electricity shortages and decrepit machinery while many farmers have struggled to meet state quotas because they lack fertilizer and modern equipment.
More broadly, the economy remains constrained by limited foreign investment and the lack of legal protections for private enterprise or procedures for contract enforcement.
Plans to set up special economic zones have remained only plans, as investors have balked at North Korea’s poor infrastructure and record of seizing assets from foreigners, not to mention the sanctions against it.
But there is evidence that the state is growing increasingly dependent on the private sector.
Cha Moon-seok, a researcher at the Institute for Unification Education of South Korea, estimates that the government collects as much as $222,000 per day in taxes from the marketplaces it manages. In March, the authorities reportedly ordered people selling goods from their homes to move into formal marketplaces in an effort to collect even more.
“Officials need the markets as much as the people need them,” said Kim Jeong-ae, a journalist in Seoul who worked as a propagandist in North Korea before defecting.
Ms. Kim fled North Korea in 2003 but has kept in touch with a younger brother there whom she describes as a donju, or money owner.
‘Loyalty Donations’
Donju is the word North Koreans use to describe the new class of traders and businessmen that has emerged.
Kim Jeong-ae said that her brother provided fuel, food and crew members for fishing boats, and that he split the catch with a military-run fishing company.
“He lives in a large house with tall walls,” she added, “so other people can’t see what he has there.”
Called “red capitalists” by South Korean scholars, donju invest in construction projects, establish partnerships with resource-strapped state factories and bankroll imports from China to supply retailers in the marketplaces. They operate with “covers,” or party officials who protect their businesses. Some are relatives of party officials.
https://static01.nyt.com/images/2017/04/30/world/30nkmarkets1/30nkmarkets1-master675.jpg
Women selling flowers in Pyongyang in April. Regular visitors to the city say a real consumer economy is emerging
Others are ethnic Chinese citizens, who are allowed regular visits to China and can facilitate cross-border financial transactions, and people with relatives who have fled to South Korea and send them cash remittances.
Whenever the state begins a big project, like the new district of high-rise apartment buildings that Kim Jong-un unveiled before foreign journalists in April, donju are expected to make “loyalty donations.” Sometimes they pay in foreign currency. Sometimes they contribute building materials, fuel or food for construction workers.
“Kim Jong-un is no fool,” said Kang Mi-jin, a defector who once ran her own wholesale business. “He knows where the money is.”
Donju often receive medals and certificates in return for their donations, and use them to signal they are protected as they engage in business activities that are officially illegal.
They import buses and trucks and run their own transportation services using license plates obtained from state companies. Some donju even rent farmland and mines, working them with their own employees and equipment, or open private pharmacies, defectors said.
“Donju wear the socialist hide, operating as part of state-run companies,” Ms. Kang said. “But inside, they are thoroughly capitalist.”
A Shifting View
Before Kim Jong-un took power, the government made a last attempt to rein in donju and control market forces. It called on citizens to shop only in state stores, banned the use of foreign currency and adopted new bank notes while limiting the amount of old notes that individuals could exchange.
The move wiped out much of the private wealth created and saved by both donju and ordinary people. Market activity ground to a near halt. Prices skyrocketed, and protests were reported in scattered cities.
The government eventually retreated and is believed to have issued an apology when officials convened villagers for their weekly education sessions. It also executed the country’s top monetary official, Pak Nam-gi.
The crisis is widely considered the moment when the government concluded it could no longer suppress the markets. A year later, Pak Pong-ju, a former prime minister who had been ousted for pushing market-oriented policies, was restored to power. He now manages the economy under Mr. Kim.
As the markets develop, growing numbers of North Koreans will see the vastly superior products made overseas and perhaps question their nation’s backward status.
“Thanks to the market, few North Koreans these days flee for food, as refugees in the 1990s did,” said the Rev. Kim Seung-eun, a pastor who has helped hundreds of defectors reach South Korea. “Instead, they now flee to South Korea to have a better life they learned through the markets.”
Jung Gwang-il, who leads a defectors’ group in Seoul called No Chain, said that with more North Koreans getting what they needed from markets rather than the state, their view of Mr. Kim was changing.
“North Koreans always called Kim Jong-un’s grandfather and father ‘the Great Leader’ or ‘the General,’” Mr. Jung said. “Now, when they talk among themselves, many just call Jong-un ‘the Kid.’ They fear him but have no respect for him.”
“They say, ‘What has he done for us?’” Mr. Jung said.
页:
[1]
2